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Sand in the Machine of EU Funds Distribution
Challenges and risks of themanagement system
of the European Union Funds
One of the most important goals of the European Union (hereinafter – the
EU) is the equalization of the economic and social development on the
whole of its territory.
To achieve these goals the EU issues regulations that are legally binding as
well as not binding for member states. It has also developed several in-
struments stimulating the development of member states. The largest fi-
nancial instruments where Latvia receives financial assistance during the
2007–2013 planning period are the EU Funds: the European Regional De-
velopment Fund (hereinafter – the ERDF), the European Social Fund (here-
inafter – the ESF) and the Cohesion Fund. They are not accessible for all
member states.1 Member states are eligible for financial resources from the
EU Funds in the event of compliance with specific criteria.
Each member state enjoys autonomy in identifying its priorities and it has
to establish an administrative and legal framework for the achievement of
the said priorities and the expending of resources of EU funds. EU institu-
tions monitor over this framework.
It is important for the member state to identify purposes for expending EU
funds in the National Strategic Reference Framework in an appropriate and
planned way as well as to establish an effective system for the manage-
ment of EU funds.2 This system must ensure a purposeful and economical
7
1 In the course of planning the future of the ESF after 2013 a proposal has been
expressed to make this Fund accessible for all EU member states because the eco-
nomic crisis has influenced the social sector in all countries. The only difference
among member states would be in the amount of the available resources.
http://tiny.cc/2pkfb Last accessed: 02.07.2010.
2 Management of European Union funds shall be the preparation, harmonisation
and approval of the necessary planning documents, establishment of a manage-
ment system of European Union funds, development of the criteria for evaluation
of project applications of European Union funds, selection and approval of project
applications of European Union funds, implementation, control, auditing, monitor-
ing and evaluation of European Union funds. (Article 4 of the Law on Management
of European Union Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund).
use of funds, including the prevention of corruption risks. However, the
management system must also be rational – it must prevent any abuse
without posing obstacles to an effective expending of resources.
1. Limitations of the analysis
There are many areas for the expending of EU Funds in Latvia. Due to the
restricted scale of the research study it was not possible to monitor all
areas. This present research study covers only sectors of education and
science without contesting the importance of other sectors. It has been de-
termined by several reasons.
Firstly, the development of education and science is a significant prereq-
uisite of the competitiveness of Latvia as well as the whole of the EU3 on the
world scale. Knowledge-based economy should be developed. The develop-
ment of these sectors may give a competitive advantage over other powers
of the world – the USA, China and India.
Secondly, the expending of EU funds must be considered in the context of
reforms recently undertaken in Latvia in sectors of education and science.
Financial resources from the EU funds have become a significant prerequi-
site for the quality development of these sectors.
Thirdly, upon the beginning of the research, the mass media released in-
formation about a specific case related to probable conflicts of interests in
the expending of EU funds, in particular in sectors of education and science.
In sectors of education and science the financing of EU funds is accessible
through the ERDF and the ESF. Therefore, the present article will highlight
the most obvious problems and corruption risks in the management of
these two funds.
Already in earlier PROVIDUS research studies the corruption risk has been
defined as “an objective prerequisite or a set of circumstances favourable
for corruption cases.”4 The purpose of the present research has been to
identify if corruption risks are present and where these risks can be found
in the management process of EU funds in sectors of education and sci-
ence, including from the viewpoint of involved persons.
8
3 Competitiveness in the economic, political, social and cultural sense.
4 Kalniņš V., Austere L. Ētikas jautājumi un korupcijas riski Rīgas apgabaltiesā
(Ethical Issues and Corruption Risks at the Riga Regional Court), Centre for Public
Policy PROVIDUS (2010), p. 4. http://tiny.cc/fi5tc Last accessed: 29.05.2010.
In the course of the research study the author interviewed several people
involved in the management process of EU funds: representatives of the
managing authority (Ministry of Finance), responsible institution (Ministry
of Education and Science), co-operation institution (the State Education De-
velopment Agency), beneficiaries of the financing of EU funds, representa-
tives of the Procurement Monitoring Bureau, as well as law-enforcement
agencies and experts from sectors of education and science. The list of inter-
views is provided at the end of the article. It must be indicated that inter-
views No. 1–3, 5–7, 13 and 14 include conversations with several repre-
sentatives of the given organisations/institutions.
The article presents views expressed in the interviews by experts on prob-
lems of the system that have come into their field of vision. An analysis has
been made of separate cases, and conclusions have been drawn on the
circumstances of these cases. Individual views on a specific case cannot
always be subjected to generalisation. Attention has been focused on prob-
lem issues that require the reconsideration of the system in its entirety as
well as in-depth research and discussions. Conclusions and proposals
should not be applied only to sectors of education and research but to the
entire system for managing EU funds.
2. Background information about EU Funds in sectors
of education and science
According to the National Strategic Reference Framework, amendments to
operational programmes, the Law on Management of European Union Struc-
tural Funds and the Cohesion Fund, during the period of 2007–2013 the
Ministry of Education and Science (hereinafter – the MoES) and State Educa-
tion Development Agency (hereinafter – the SEDA) are responsible for the
organisation of 9 open project application selections and 28 restricted
project application selections for the allocation of the financing from the
EU funds.
In the area of education and science the resources of EU funds may be re-
ceived by research institutions, public administration agencies, institutions
and companies that perform public administration functions, municipal in-
stitutions, educational institutions as well as other legal persons registered
in the Republic of Latvia.
Approximately 16% of all financial resources of EU funds (LVL 3.18 billion)
are allocated to science and education.
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3. Detected problems and probable corruption risks
One of the fundamental values of the EU is the rule of law. Corruption is in-
compatible with the idea of a law-based state. Failure to curb corruption af-
fects also the accessibility of resources of EU funds and their efficient
spending. If a member state fails to take measures required to prevent cor-
ruption risks, the EU may not reimburse resources spent in the course of
project implementation and may freeze resources of the fund in future.5
The expending of EU funds is not protected against corruption risks. The
inefficiency of the management system and lack of project transparency,
on the one hand, as well as the large and yet at the same time limited re-
sources of EU funds, on the other hand, constitute a potentially favourable
environment for corruption risks. In some countries an equalisation mark
is put between the expending of EU funds and corruption.6 In Latvia such
a perception among the general public does not exist. “Until now there has
been no knowledge of any scandalous criminal cases on violations in the
expending of EU funds.”7 Such a situation may testify to the absence of
violations or the inability of law enforcement agencies to detect them.
Neither should the myth about corruption in the EU fund management sys-
tem be disseminated. The cultivation of such a myth in itself is a corrup-
tion risk as it may encourage project applicants to resort to corrupt
methods to exert influence and provides grounds for institutions and
officials to set inadequate requirements and to demand privileges, e.g.,
higher remuneration to minimise a risk that in reality does not exist.
However, refraining from the dissemination of the myth does not preclude
the discussion of problems in the EU fund management system. Although
representatives of the Ministry of Finance (hereinafter – the MoF) have indi-
cated that the management system excludes, to a maximum degree, syste-
mic corruption risks, still they have manifested themselves in theoretical
as well as practical terms.
Interviews brought to the fore cases and those phases in the EU fund manage-
ment system where corruption risks might exist.
10
5 See Castle, S. Bulgaria Risks Losing Funds from EU. The New York Times.
http://tiny.cc/guoct Last accessed: 06.05.2010.
Romania Risks EU Funds Freeze Over Lingering Corruption. Deutche Welle.
12.02.2009. http://tiny.cc/eiutn Last accessed: 06.05.2010.
6 See Georgiev, O. Mayor for EU Funds. The Sofia Echo. 26.03.2010.
http://tiny.cc/rkf7q Last accessed: 06.05.2010.
7 Interviews No. 12 and No. 13.
3.1. Insufficient understanding of conflicts of interest
There are two cases when an individual may find himself/herself in a con-
flict of interest. The first case is when the individual consciously places
himself/herself in such a situation. The second case is when the individ-
ual’s ignorance places the person in a situation of a conflict of interest.
The analysis of statistics on cases of administrative violations collated by
the Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau (hereinafter – the CPCB)8
for the period of 2007–2009 allows concluding that cases of administra-
tive violations concerning conflicts of interest have been initiated com-
paratively frequently against representatives of the system of education
(principals of comprehensive schools, representatives of higher educa-
tional institutions) and representatives of local government involved in the
expending of EU funds.
The said statistics testifies to the nihilistic attitude towards legal restric-
tions or failure to understand this regulation. It potentially creates cor-
ruption risks in the expending of EU funds.
The CPCB and other institutions should undertake explanatory work and
provide training on the regulation of conflicts of interest for individuals
involved in the EU funds management system.
3.2. Complexity of the procedure and the excessive amount
of documents to be submitted
The majority of respondents recognised the excessive bureaucracy of the
procedure for expending EU funds. This conclusion ensues also from a
more extensive research study on the satisfaction of beneficiaries of the
funding.9 The disproportionate number of required documents makes the
procedure more complex, oblique and less transparent as well as obstructs
monitoring and control. Other tenders for EU grants and funds are quoted
in contrast as good examples.10
11
8 KNAB lēmumi administratīvo pārkāpumu lietās 2007., 2008. gadā un 2009. gada
pirmajā pusgadā (Decisions of the CPCB on cases of administrative violations in
2007, 2008 and the first half of 2009). Available respectively: http://tiny.cc/5pbv5;
http://tiny.cc/1zt5z; http://tiny.cc/7kwep Last accessed: 06.05.2010.
9 Latvijas Fakti. Centralizētais Eiropas Savienības fondu finansējuma saņēmēju
apmierinātības izvērtējums (Centralised assessment of the satisfaction rate of
beneficiaries of the financing of EU funds). December 2009. http://tiny.cc/pp7bz
Last accessed: 17.05.2010.
10 Interview No. 8.
The complexity of the procedure may serve as a cover for illegal activities.
It is also a cause of misunderstandings that may lead to the recognition of
the ineligibility of costs. Procedures are so complicated that it is easy to
make errors without additional methodological guidance.11
Several measures should be implemented to facilitate the procedure and
make it more open:
A. An assessment should be made of documents that would not be re-
quired for submission. For example, “those documents that are not re-
quired for the evaluation and which demonstrate compliance with
administrative requirements, need not be submitted at the evaluation
stage. They could be submitted when the decision on the approval of
the project idea is taken.”12
B. The electronic circulation of documents and a single electronic plat-
form/system should be introduced that would make the procedure
more effective and more transparent as well as facilitate monitoring and
control. The amount of printed documents would decrease.
A positive development is that already now beneficiaries of the funding
within the frame of activities monitored by the MoES have the right to submit
project applications in the form of an electronic document, signed by a safe
electronic signature and verified by the time stamp in line with regulatory
enactments on filing electronic documents. Moreover, if the beneficiary of
the funding desires to submit the project application in the printed format,
an identical electronic version of the project application form must be an-
nexed. Likewise project applications and accompanying documents are
submitted electronically also to other tenders for funds and grants related
to the EU, for example, in the EU 7th Framework Programme for the develop-
ment of science and technology. This approach has proved to be an effec-
tive way for a transparent organisation of procedures and it should be put
to maximum use also in the circulation of other documents.
Currently, the EU Funds Management Information System (hereinafter – the
MIS) has been established. However, the Ernst & Young Baltic (in 2008)13
12
11 Libeka, M. Projektu upuri – septiņpadsmit pašvaldības (Victims of Projects – Seven-
teen Local Governments). Latvijas Avīze, 12.03.2010.
12 Interview No. 11.
13 See: 2007.–2013. gadu plānošanas periodam izveidotās Eiropas Savienības struk-
tūrfondu un Kohēzijas fonda vadības un kontroles sistēmas atbilstības novērtē-
jums (Compliance assessment of the management and control system of the
European Union Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund established for the
2007–2013 planning period). Ernst & Young Baltic, 03.03.2008., pp. 276–281. Not
published.
and the National Audit Office (in 2010)14 detected a set of failings in the
given system. At times the MIS fails to provide information of the required
quality for the process of implementing EU funds. It fails to provide the
maximum benefit that it can potentially give. Chapters of the MIS cannot be
used as a tool for the monitoring of EU funds.
Ways should be considered how this management system could make the
procedure maximum open and clear and would enable to trace the progress
of the procedure without any difficulty from the start to the end. It should
provide as far as possible more comprehensive information. Corruption
risks could be reduced with the help of this system if it was appropriate
content-wise (full information, compatible with other registers, accurate,
open) as well as functionally sufficient for ensuring monitoring. The de-
velopment of such a system will facilitate the introduction of the accounting
standard in public and municipal institutions. Besides, solutions should be
sought so that beneficiaries of funding that are outside public administra-
tion could be included in the single system.
An often-mentioned reason for lack of success until now in developing such
a system, is “reluctance to make the procedure more transparent and open.
Proposals on the introduction of a single electronic platform that have been
expressed to date, have been rejected.”15 Similar information systems for
the reduction of corruption risks have been established in other sectors,
e.g., construction and spatial planning.16
Interviewees recognised that the excessive regulation of specific issues al-
ternated with lack of regulation and control. The conclusion and amend-
ment of contracts on project implementation was one of such areas that
were mentioned. “The practice of institutions in negotiating and amending
contract terms is not subject to sufficient control.”17
13
14 See: Valsts kontroles 07.01.2010. revīzijas ziņojums Nr. 5.1-2-25/2009 (Audit
Report No. 5.1-2-25/2009 of the National Audit Office), pp. 8, 11, 41, 44–45, 48, 50.
http://tiny.cc/jge07 Last accessed: 29.05.2010.
15 Interview No. 2.
16 See: MK 15.03.2010. rīkojums Nr. 147 “Par elektroniskās pārvaldes un informā-
cijas sabiedrības attīstības prioritāro projektu sarakstu” (Cabinet Decree No. 147
of 15.03.10 “On List of Priority Projects for the Development of Electronic Admin-
istration and Information Society”). http://tiny.cc/wnmru Last accessed:
13.05.2010.
17 Interview No. 9.
3.3. Project application selection and evaluation
Quality of criteria. Interviewees pointed out lack of the quality of selec-
tion criteria. “Not infrequently they are changed during the call for selection
following objections and directions of project applicants.”18 It affects the
time frame for project selection and implementation as well. The project
submission deadline for Activity 2.1.1.1 “Support to science and research”
was prolonged twice. The first submission deadline was 14 December, while
the second submission deadline was 9 February and the final submission
deadline was 9 March. It cannot be excluded that these cases have objective
reasons behind them, however, still the question remains if all possible
measures had been taken earlier to prevent the postponement.
In this Activity “the acquisition of patents was stipulated as a performance
indicator. During the project implementation it could not be achieved due
to objective reasons because the patent registration procedure lasts longer.
Thus Regulations of the Cabinet of Ministers (hereinafter – the CoM) were
amended prescribing that the performance indicator was submitted
patents.”19
Initially Subactivity 3.1.2.1.1 “Modernization of Premises and Devices for
Improvement of Study Programme Quality at Higher Educational Estab-
lishments, including Provision of Education Opportunities for Individuals
with Functional Disabilities” contained a criterion prescribing that the fund-
ing from the ERDF could be received by higher educational institutions and
it could be invested in the infrastructure that higher educational institu-
tions possessed or administered. As properties used by public higher educa-
tional institutions are owned by the state, amendments to the criteria were
undertaken for the 2nd round of project selection providing that higher educa-
tional institutions could make investments in real estate transferred for
their use for a period no less than five years after project implementation.
One of the interviewees considered evaluation criterion 3.5.4 for Activity
2.1.1.2 “Support to International Cooperation Projects in Research and
Technologies (EUREKA, 7th FP, etc.)” illogical – the said criterion stipulated
the following: “An analysis of alternatives and the economic analysis of the
project have been made that has been substantiated by calculations and
justifies the choice of the proposed alternative, and the chosen alternative
has the lowest costs. “The criterion is not logical and justified for activities
listed in the project call as an alternative with the lowest costs means doing
14
18 Interviews No. 1 and No. 8.
19 Interview No. 8.
nothing at all or cooperation only with the closest neighbouring coun-
tries.”20
According to the opinion of interviewees, the criteria cannot be interpreted
unambiguously, and this is confirmed by the comparatively frequent ques-
tions of applicants21 to organisers of the selection and the radically diver-
gent evaluations of one and the same application given by different
evaluators. Thus, at least sometimes subjectivism prevails over an objec-
tive evaluation.
The understanding of criteria is specified also during the evaluation stage.
During the first round of the project application selection for Activity
1.1.1.2 “Attraction of Human Resources to Science” one of the criteria was
the evaluation of the profundity of the project implementation–related risk
assessment and the plan for their reduction. Projects were evaluated with
a low number of points as evaluators indicated that no sufficient analysis
had been made of legal risks in relation to employment law although this
requirement did not explicitly ensue from the guidelines.22
“In the evaluation an excessive focus is on the quantitative indicators rather
than qualitative indicators. Compliance with formal requirements is a pri-
ority.”23 As concerns the risk assessment and the plan for their reduction,
a perception has developed that “evaluators seldom evaluate this assess-
ment or it is done in a superficial manner as similar risk assessments are
submitted from one project to another and until now no negative evalua-
tion or critical comments have been received.”24
These are some of the examples that give grounds for disputing the quality
of the defined criteria. A circumstance that is mentioned as the cause of such
a situation is that “they are formulated by public officials who lack com-
petence and who have no background knowledge of the sector.”25 Certainly,
such a statement should be perceived with due criticism. Experts of the
15
20 Interview No. 5.
21 For example, answers to questions concerning the filing of forms and project
implementation for Activity 2.1.1.1 “Support to science and research”, p. 37.
http://esfondi.izm.gov.lv/sites/default/files/root/2.1.1.1._aktivitate/jautajumi_
atbildes%202.1.1.1_aktualizets_11.01.2010pdf.pdf Last accessed: 29.05.2010.
22 Advanced Social and Political Research Institute 05.06.2009 letter NM 01-03/ to
José Manuel Silva Rodriguez, Director-General, Directorate General for Research,
European Commission. Not published.
23 Interview No. 2.
24 Interview No. 6.
25 Interviews No. 2 and No. 11.
sector are involved in the development of criteria for project evaluation
and they are approved by the Monitoring Committee whose meetings are
attended also by social partners and representatives of the European Com-
mission. However, this cooperation model that deserves a positive evalua-
tion fails to completely eliminate failings. Cooperation fails to achieve its
maximum effectiveness. It should be stimulated to ensure that participants
have sufficient time and resources to consider criteria and to formulate
proposals. Neither can it be excluded that project implementers are not
sufficiently competent to understand criteria.
Institutional competence. The majority of amendments to Cabinet regu-
lations on activities concern decisions of the MoF as the managing author-
ity of EU funds that are related to the volatile conditions for the imple-
mentation of EU funds. There is evidence of the shortsightedness of the MoF
on specific issues and cooperation with the MoF cannot always be assessed
as efficient. Inconsistencies result in an irreversible loss of time and re-
sources.
“The MoF does not always understand problems of the sector, e.g., issues
of the property of higher educational institutions (they are used by higher
educational institutions but they are not possessed by the institutions,
while criteria have been developed in a way as if the properties belonged
to higher educational institutions). Initially this problem was ignored, how-
ever, after half a year the MoF had to step down from its initial opinion.” 26
“There was an intention to use EU funds also for the repairs of in-service
hotels in the sector of vocational education. The MoF objected as the repairs
should be financed by the national budget. However, during the meeting of
the Monitoring Committee in March this year the MoF changed its opinion.
The MoF started work on the flat rate of indirect costs (flat ration between
the direct project (implementation) costs and indirect (administrative)
costs) in 2007, the rate was promised in 2008, however, it was introduced
only in March 2010, by amending Cabinet Regulations No. 419 “On proce-
dures, by which the institutions involved in the management of European
Union funds ensure the preparation of planning documents and introduc-
tion of the European Union funds.” It resulted in the necessity to amend
other Cabinet Regulations.”27 Although the introduction of the flat rate for
indirect costs depended on negotiations with the European Commission,
still the length of the time spent on this case raises the question of the ef-
ficiency of the negotiation process.
16
26 Interview No. 4.
27 Ibid.
Likewise the economic crisis has introduced corrections in a range of is-
sues, including the issue of remuneration for employees of institutions of
the EU fund management system. It cannot be maintained unambiguously
that the reduction of employees’ salaries results in a proportional growth
of corruption risks. However, this circumstance may facilitate the appear-
ance of such risks. Thus during the transition period additional attention
should be paid to this matter.
Changes in remuneration also stimulate the exit of the qualified staff,
bringing about fluctuations in the institutional competence level. The in-
competence and lack of professionalism of the staff at institutions involved
in management has been pointed out also in a more extensive survey as
replies provided to questions of project applicants are contradictory, formal
and vague.28
Evaluators. In specific tenders submitted project applications are not
evaluated only by members of the evaluation committee but also by in-
vited experts. However, respondents held different views concerning the
quality of the work of experts and members of the commission involved in
the evaluation. “At times evaluations of experts given for one and the same
criterion differ significantly and they do not substantiate the evaluation
they have given. In specific cases members of the evaluation commission
also fail to present their arguments why their opinion differs from the evalu-
ations given by experts.”29 It gives grounds to conclude that additional at-
tention should be paid to the selection of members of the evaluation
commission and experts as well as to their training for the evaluation pro-
cedure to ensure that evaluators had the same understanding of criteria
and they are capable of giving the evaluation.
If the process of involving experts is conducted in an objective manner it
reduces corruption risks. Additional “eyes” are supplied for the evaluation
process. However, the situation when experts for the evaluation of project
applications are chosen following the lowest price offer, deserves criticism.
17
28 Centralizētais Eiropas Savienības fondu finansējuma saņēmēju apmierinātības
izvērtējums (Centralised assessment of the satisfaction rate of beneficiaries of the
financing of EU funds). Latvijas Fakti, December 2009, p. 12. http://tiny.cc/pp7bz
Last accessed: 17.05.2010.
29 Interviews No.1. and No.8; Advanced Social and Political Research Institute
05.06.2009 letter NM 01-03/ to José Manuel Silva Rodriguez, Director-General,
Directorate General for Research, European Commission. Not published.; Also the
Report on Internal Audit No. 07-03/151/a/09 by the SEDA includes evidence of
such trend. Not published.
Professionalism on the specific issue and objectivity should be the indica-
tors to follow. Remuneration would then be the next issue to consider. In
a situation when interests of experts are not subjected to any in-depth
examination, the expert who is most interested in the outcome of the tender
may offer an inadequately low price which is also the lowest, and thus acquire
the opportunity to influence the evaluation process.
An in-depth examination should be made of the potential links among in-
dividuals involved in the evaluation process and project applicants. Com-
pliance with formal requirements does not prevent risks, moreover, even
these formal requirements are not always followed. There have been cases
when not all of the members of the commission have signed forms on ob-
jectivity and non-disclosure of information.30 The SEDA and other institu-
tions should take active measures to identify interests of evaluators. These
institutions themselves should conduct at least a prima facie examination.
Alongside with the submission of their CVs evaluators should reveal also
their interests that could potentially overlap with interests of project ap-
plicants. They should indicate potential risks and doubts that may arise
concerning their objectivity. “More responsibility should be laid on evalu-
ators.”31
During project selections the evaluation process may be attended also by
observers. The specific observers are established by respective Cabinet
regulations. A question arises if individuals and organisations not listed in
Cabinet regulations may attend the process. Currently the range of ob-
servers is not extensive. According to one of the present observers, they
“expressed their desire to participate in the evaluation of project applica-
tions on their own initiative. Initially institutions were sceptical about this
idea.”32 Likewise “at times it is difficult to find people who are not related
to any of project applicants” among observers (organisations) themselves.”33
Thus, the possibility of expanding the body of observers should be con-
sidered and the general public should be invited to participate more ac-
tively in this process.
Organisation of the selection. The issue of the way of organising project
selection is important from the point of evaluation. As it has already been
18
30 Gada kontroles ziņojums. Revīzijas iestāde, 01.07.2008.-30.06.2009. (Annual
Report. Audit Authority, 01.07.2008.-30.06.2009.), p. 54. http://tiny.cc/8iinh Last
accessed: 12.05.2010; Ziņojums par iekšējo auditu Nr. 07-03/151/a/09 VIAA (Re-
port on Internal Audit No. 07-03/151/a/09, SEDA). Not published.
31 Interview No. 8.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
indicated above, the Ministry of Education and Science and the State Edu-
cation Development Agency are in charge of the organisation of 9 open
project application selections and 28 restricted project application selec-
tions. There are noticeably more restricted tenders than the open tenders.
One of the explanations might be that there is a limited range of potential
beneficiaries of the funding in the sector of education and science.
Restricted selection is applied also in allocating support to the implemen-
tation of doctoral study programmes. The purpose of the subactivity is to
increase the number of specialists in all thematic groups of education who
have received a doctoral degree and are capable of planning, creating and
implementing in production high technology products as well as products
and services with a high value added, promoting the development of na-
tional economy on the basis of innovations. The project applicant may be
a higher educational institution that implements one or several doctoral
study programmes in any thematic group of education. Cabinet regulations
provide that the Ministry of Education and Science sends an invitation to
submit a project application to a restricted number of project applicants.34
The Ministry of Education and Science sends the invitations on basis of its
own calculations which higher educational institutions could meet the
identified criteria.
The basic principle is that an open selection procedure should be organised
in the distribution of the financing of EU funds and public agencies must
be neutral. If special circumstances exist (e.g., there is only one candidate)
the restricted selection may be organised.35
Stepping back from the selection for the specific subactivity for the support
of doctoral students, it would be more appropriate from the point of open-
ness to establish beneficiaries of the financing with the help of the open se-
lection if it allows achieving the same aims. Thus, all institutions capable
of qualifying for specific criteria, should be allowed to submit their project
applications. The range of candidates is established not by the responsible
authority but by the potential candidates themselves who perceive their
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34 MK 21.10.2008. noteikumi Nr. 882 “Noteikumi par darbības programmas “Cilvēk-
resursi un nodarbinātība” papildinājuma 1.1.2.1.2. apakšaktivitāti “Atbalsts dok-
tora studiju programmu īstenošanai”“ (Cabinet Regulations No. 882 of 21.10.08
“On Amendment of Subactivity 1.1.2.1.2. “Support to Doctor’s Studies” of the Oper-
ational Programme “Human Resources and Employment”), Clause 12.1.4, Latvijas
Vēstnesis, 07.11.2008, No. 174.
35 See Kosa, E. Preferential Project in the 2nd Hungarian National Development
Plan. In: Koštal, C. (ed.). Guarding Change: Civil Society as Watchdogs of EU Funds,
Slovak Governance Institute (2008), pp. 56–57.
ability to qualify for the procedure. Thus, it would be possible to eliminate
any doubt that the responsible authority has restricted the range of appli-
cations without due justification. Such practice would be particularly rele-
vant in other sectors where the range of candidates is more extensive than
in sectors of education and science.
3.4. Involvement of foreign professionals in the evaluation
of project applications
During interviews several respondents pointed out that it was at the proj-
ect application evaluation stage that corruption risks were potentially most
possible. In the area of education and science in Latvia there is a limited
number of specialists who may be independent and perform the evalua-
tion of project applications professionally. Not infrequently the evaluator
and the project applicant are bound by personal relationships. “Often the
quality of project applications is similar, thus not infrequently everything
may be decided by a minor error or interference.”36 In the event of the need
to assess some specific issue the range of potential evaluators is even more
restricted. It is the peculiarity of small countries. “Even though no conflict
of interest can be detected in the evaluation of project applications, still
often it may be a violation of professional ethics.”37
A conflict of interest can be detected in the first round of project applica-
tion selection for Activity 1.1.1.2 “Attraction of Human Resources to Sci-
ence.” The initial decisions of the SEDA on the rejection of project
applications were contested by 53 applicants. As a result the Ministry of
Education and Science took the decision to revoke all decisions of the SEDA
on the approval, conditional approval or rejection of project applications
as well as to entrust the SEDA with the task of improving procedures ap-
plied in the evaluation process and to undertake a repeated evaluation of
project applications submitted for the first project application selection
round. It is the first case when all results of the selection were revoked and
a repeated evaluation performed. The Ministry of Education and Science
found that the evaluation commission that had been approved by the SEDA
included persons representing research institutions whose project applica-
tions were on the list of approved project applications which was contrary
to the principle of the ethics of public administration and the principle of
procedural justice. Although the said persons had not participated in the
evaluation of project applications submitted by the research institution
they represented or where research institutions that they represented acted
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as cooperation partners, still they had evaluated projects of other research
institutions – their competitors in the given selection, thus giving grounds
to doubt about the objectivity of the evaluation process.38
The specific violation was eliminated not within the frame of the self-control
of the system itself but due to the pressure of the rejected applicants. One
of the rejected project applicants notified the European Commission and
the Ministry of Education and Science about the situation that had devel-
oped.39 It was requested in the letter not only to assess the specific situa-
tion but the problem of the objectivity of evaluation in EU funds was
generalised indicating that foreign professionals should be involved in the
evaluation of project applications for EU funds.
Likewise the interviewees also indicated the necessity of involving foreign
professionals in project application evaluation. They gave the following ar-
guments “for” and “against” this intention.
Table 1
Arguments concerning the involvement of foreign professionals
in project application evaluation
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FOR
1. It will ensure more objectivity and
credibility for the taken decisions.
2. The body of professionals in Latvia
is exceedingly limited, it would be a
rare case if the professional had no
or had had no relation to the appli-
cant. Besides there is no guarantee
that the professional might not come
into contact with the respective
funding.
AGAINST
1. They will not always be able to
comprehensively assess the situa-
tion in Latvia.
2. It will not be possible to involve re-
spective professionals in all sec-
tors.
3. Foreign professionals are competi-
tors in the EU research space – they
can steal an idea and they can sink
an idea.
38 Latvijas Republikas Izglītības un zinātnes ministrija. Lēmums Nr. 332 “Par Valsts
izglītības attīstības aģentūras 1.1.1.2. aktivitātē “Cilvēkresursu piesaiste zināt-
nei” pieņemto lēmumu atcelšanu”. 30.09.2009. (Decision of the MoES No. 332 of
30.09.09 “On Revocation of Decisions Taken by the State Educaton Development
Agency in Activity 1.1.1.2 “Attraction of Human Resources to Science”“). Not pub-
lished.
39 Advanced Social and Political Research Institute 05.06.2009 letter NM 01-03/ to
José Manuel Silva Rodriguez, Director-General, Directorate General for Research,
European Commission. Not published.
Views expressed in interviews concerning the involvement of foreign pro-
fessionals in project evaluation are most often “in favour” of their involve-
ment. The assessment of the opinions expressed allows concluding that
“in favour” is more convincing and the implementation of this idea would
contribute significantly to the reduction of corruption risks. It would make
the procedure fairer, more open, efficient and would promote the trust of
the general public in decisions taken by public administration. Foreign pro-
fessionals could be involved as members of the commission or experts.
Neither would it preclude the involvement of local professionals.
The necessity of entrusting the evaluation of project applications to quali-
fied foreign professionals of good standing has been discussed in other EU
member states as well. It would ensure more objectivity in project selection.40
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40 See Kralikova, R. The Structural Funds and the Higher Education and Research
Sector. How to Fully Utilize this Relationship? In: Koštal, C. (ed.). Guarding Change:
Civil Society as Watchdogs of EU Funds, Slovak Governance Institute (2008).
3. The expending of EU funds is not en-
visaged solely for the protectionist
development of some member state
but for the capacity building of edu-
cation and science in the EU.
4. There are ethical norms of scientists
that prohibit any theft of ideas. More-
over, the ability and understanding
of how the idea can be implemented
in practice are more important than
the idea itself.
5. The requirement to submit the proj-
ect application (at least its part) in
English is not excessive as English is
the language of communication in
the research community. Already
now in many cases the research part
of the project application is filed in
English.
6. Often projects are international.
7. Local scientists lobby their sectors.
8. Project evaluation costs would be
lower if project applications were
submitted electronically.
4. Currently regulatory enactments
do not allow any transfer of the per-
formance of tasks that can be per-
formed by public administration
itself.
5. It will incur additional costs (trans-
lation costs, fees, per diem etc.).
International tenders must be announced for the involvement of foreign
professionals. However, as this problem exists not only in Latvia but also
in several EU member states, the solution should be sought at the EU level.
Common guidelines should be developed in the EU for the exchange of pro-
fessionals; a database of experts should be established etc. The establish-
ment of such a system would be in the interests of member states as well
as the EU as it would reduce corruption risks, making project selection
fairer and the expending of EU funds more effective.
Conclusions that have been drawn by the CPCB concerning the above situ-
ation and the conflict of interest should be viewed critically.41 The CPCB
recognised that no conflict of interest could be detected in the given situa-
tion as neither evaluators nor their relatives had participated in the for-
mulation of the submitted projects. Thus it ensues from the statement of
the CPCB that the situation that persons closely related to project appli-
cants evaluate competing project applications is acceptable. Although the
respective persons had not participated in the evaluation of project appli-
cations submitted by the research institution that they represented or by
a cooperation partner of their research institution, it does not prevent
giving an unjustifiably low evaluation to other project applications. The
CPCB has interpreted the interest of these persons too narrowly. In addition
the CPCB indicated that members of the evaluation commission had not
been included in lists of public officials.
3.5. Lack of argumentation in decisions on the rejection
of project applications
Quite a few of the interviewees drew attention to lack of argumentation in
project rejections. It is not possible upon reading decisions to understand
reasons for the rejection of project applications. No sufficient argumenta-
tion is presented in the decisions. Even if the applicant of a rejected project
wanted to appeal the specific decision, it could not be done without re-
questing additional information. Thus, an obstacle is created for efficient
appeals. A positive example mentioned by the interviewees is the Social
Integration Fund which provides more extensive argumentation in its de-
cisions.
In their turn, representatives and decision-makers of the MoF expressed
the view during interviews that at present decisions provided sufficient
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41 KNAB priekšnieka 02.11.2009. vēstule Nr.1/9546 (Letter of the Head of the CPCB
No. 1/9546 in 02.11.2009).
substantiation. Thus, there is a clash of two views. To illustrate this clash
see examples of decisions on the rejection of project applications by the
SEDA and the Social Integration Fund (Riga planning region) on the Internet
(www.corruption-c.wikidot.com un www.politika.lv).42
In this respect another significant development is the judgment of the De-
partment of Administrative Cases of the Senate of the Supreme Court,43
which provides an analysis of the sufficiency of arguments at the basis of
the decision taken by the administration of the Latvian Environment Pro-
tection Fund to reject the financing of the project of the society “Latvian
Lakes” within the frame of the national budget programme “Latvia Environ-
ment Fund”.
In this case the council of the Fund has failed to substantiate why the inclu-
sion of the task that is in the competence of the Board of River Basins, in the
applicant’s project for the amount that constituted 0.76% of the project
amount, makes the allocation of funding for the applicant’s project abso-
lutely impermissible.
In view of the fact that the decision lacked extensive argumentation, the
court found that the decision taken by the council of the Fund violated the
principle of the prohibition of arbitrariness, which is a significant proce-
dural violation and constitutes grounds for finding the decision taken by
the said institution to be illegal. The principle of the prohibition of arbi-
trariness requires that actions of the state have reasonable substantiation
and that everyone can ascertain of the existence of this substantiation. As
the substantiation of the action taken by the state is reflected in the argu-
mentation the principle of the prohibition of arbitrariness is closely linked
to the principle of justification. The said principle is included in Article 9
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42 Valsts izglītības attīstības aģentūra. Lēmums Nr.05.-5.1.4./121 “Par projekta
iesnieguma noraidīšanu”, 29.04.2009. uz 1 lpp. (Decision of the SEDA No. 05.-
5.1.4./121 of 29.04.09 “On Rejection of Project Application” on one page).
Rīgas plānošanas reģions. Lēmums Nr. 3/8 “Par Tieslietu ministrijas un Sabiedrī-
bas integrācijas fonda kopīgi izveidoto grantu shēmu “Pilsoniskās sabiedrības
stiprināšanas atbalsta programma 2010” projektu konkursa Nr. 2010.LV rezultā-
tiem”, 10.05.2010 uz 4 lpp. (Decision of the Riga Planning Region No. 3/8 of
10.05.10 “On Results of Project Tender No. 2010LV for the Grant Scheme “Sup-
port Programme to Strengthening Civic Society 2010” Established Jointly by the
Ministry of Justice and the Social Integration Fund” on 4 pages).
43Augstākās tiesas Senāta Administratīvo lietu departamenta 22.03.2010.
spriedums lietā Nr. SKA-58/2010. (Judgment of the Department of Administrative
Cases of the Senate of the Supreme Court of 22.03.10 in case No. SKA-58/2010).
http://tiny.cc/kyk7y Last accessed:. 07.05.2010.
of the Administrative Procedure Law which provides that administrative
acts may be based on facts such as are necessary for the taking of a deci-
sion and on the objective and rational legal considerations arising from
such facts.
For example, in another case – in Decision of the SEDA No. 05-5.1.4./121 (in
29 April 2009) “On Rejection of the Project Application” the project applica-
tion has been evaluated with 8 points, however, the decision does not list
any failings found in the project application. No answer has been given to
the question why the project application has been rejected. Likewise in the
above case court did not find any answer to this question in the decision.
If the whole argumentation is not included in the decision already at the
initial stage, then court will have no grounds for reviewing other objec-
tions of the institution that have not been included in the decision as its
justification. If a decision without extensive argumentation is taken to
court, it may be expected that it will be found to be contrary to the law.
The administrative act cannot contain only the result of legal relations. It
must contain extensive argumentation that has led to the said result. De-
cisions on rejection must provide more substantiation, ensuring a balance
between the principle of justification and the principle of the economy of
public administration resources.
3.6. Lack of external control over the project evaluation process
The Administrative Court exercises independent, objective and competent
control over decisions and actions of public administration. However, at
present applicants of rejected project applications do not seek redress in
court. It has several reasons: due to the lengthy court proceedings even a
positive judgment does not give any possibility of receiving the funding for
project implementation. Moreover, one of the applicants pointed out in the
interview that “there are cases when it would be worth going to court, how-
ever, the restraining factor is the unwillingness to “spoil” relations with the
respective institutions because other project applications have also been
submitted.”44
An external and independent control mechanism is not sufficiently effective
and it allows institutions to be light-minded in decision-making. The appeal
of the decision should suspend the conclusion of the project implementation
agreement, at the same time establishing an efficient mechanism of appeal.
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The principle of the rule of law and the principle of the efficient use of re-
sources of EU funds would be balanced resulting in more benefit than the
instituted restrictions. The task of control may be performed by the ad-
ministrative court or any other specialised institution. The control mechan-
ism could be made more efficient in several ways:
A. It could be prescribed that the administrative court is to review appli-
cations at shorter notice outside the general procedure. Applications
could be reviewed only by one or two court instances.
B. It could be prescribed in cases on the distribution of resources of EU
funds that the project applicant or the applicant to court may request
temporary regulation provided that after the court decision on the tem-
porary regulation the project applicant can implement his/her intended
activities with his/her own financial resources. In the event of a favour-
able court judgment, the state is to reimburse all incurred project im-
plementation costs.
C. Administrative review boards or quasi-courts operate in several Euro-
pean countries (e.g., Lithuania, the Netherlands). They are independent
from public administration and consist of experts from the respective
sector. Such a quasi-court should be established in Latvia as well for is-
sues of EU funds. It could be established at least as an ad hoc institu-
tion. It would provide a speedy and independent review of disputes
arising in relation to the expending of EU funds. Dispute resolution
through such an institution would take much less time than in court
(maximum within a month’s time). These courts win increasingly more
confidence of the general public abroad.
D. The Ombudsman’s Office should take a more active part in the moni-
toring of the quality of the EU fund management. It is possible that a
special ombudsman could be established to review disputes as well as
to provide an external assessment and proposals for the improvement
of the system.
Each of these proposals has its pluses and minuses. The best option should
be negotiated by discussing all the above proposals.
3.7. Expansion of the limits of the accessibility of information
The accessibility and openness of information is a significant prerequisite
for the reduction of corruption risks. It was pointed out during interviews
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that applicants of projects rejected during the first round of the project
selection for Activity 1.1.1.2 “Attraction of Human Resources to Science”
did not receive part of documents. “Records of evaluation commission
meetings were not issued as it is not possible to conceal names of evalua-
tors.”45
Article 29 Section 4 of the Law on Management of European Union Struc-
tural Funds and the Cohesion Fund prescribes that information regarding
persons who evaluate or have evaluated the application of the European
Union fund project shall not be disclosed, except members of the evalua-
tion committee. The information regarding the members of evaluation com-
mittee is available in the amount and according to the procedures specified
in this Law and other regulatory enactments.
The inability to cover up names does not constitute legitimate grounds for
failure to issue documents. After the closing of the evaluation process the
argumentation must be publicly available. Such practice would create con-
fidence in the fairness and legitimacy of the process as well as enable to
more effectively protect one’s rights and interests in the event of a violation.
The content of Article 29 Section 4 should be reconsidered. Failure to fully
disclose evaluators restricts the possibility of project applicants and the
rest of the society to follow the evaluation process, to detect any conflict
of interest and possible corruption cases. Names of evaluators should not
be disclosed before and during the evaluation process. After the closing of
the evaluation process they should be disclosed as the necessity to pro-
tect them against possible pressures ceases to exist. It is important to as-
certain of the neutrality of evaluators.46
From the point of openness it is important that information about the re-
sults of project application selection is timely and publicly available. It en-
ables the general public to point out potential failings and violations.
Foreign experts also highlight the necessity of making the information pub-
licly available and the desirable amount of information.47
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46 See Muravjov, S. Sizing Up to the Task: Monitoring of European Union Funds in
Lithuania. In: Koštal, C. (ed.). Guarding Change: Civil Society as Watchdogs of EU
Funds, Slovak Governance Institute (2008), p. 26.
47 See Kasakova, Z. Access to Information Relating to EU Structural Funds and Im-
plementation System in Czech Republic. In: Koštal, C. (ed.). Guarding Change: Civil
Society as Watchdogs of EU Funds, Slovak Governance Institute (2008), pp. 160–181.
Table 2
Amount of available information
Information categories Actually available48
that should be publicly available
Description of the evaluation system Yes
Information describing applicants Yes
Information describing projects Yes
List of approved and rejected project applications Yes
Number of points awarded upon evaluation No
Amount of the allocated funding Yes
Argumentation of the approval and rejection of project No
applications
Names of evaluators No
Contact person Yes
Even though at present “there is no obligation to make the methodology of
the assessment criteria publicly available, in some specific cases it is prac-
ticed.”49 Such explanations improve the understanding of criteria and make
the evaluation process more predictable. The generalisation of the obliga-
tion to make the methodology publicly available should be considered.
It would be necessary to re-examine the limits of the applicability of the
status of information of restricted access to documents of EU funds. Like-
wise the scale of information accessibility concerning the results of the
project application selection should be reconsidered.
3.8. Inability to fight violations in the procurement procedure
Public procurement is an area most exposed to corruption risks, as, on the
one hand, in the process of administering public financial resources public
officials may be tempted to gain direct or indirect material benefit, on the
other hand, bidders are interested in being awarded the procurement contract
and to make more profit during the execution of the procurement contract.
Violations in the area of procurement have a high latency as both involved
parties – the commissioning party and the supplier are interested in con-
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48 Chapter “EU Structural Funds” on the websites of the MoES (www.izm.gov.lv)
and the SEDA (www.viaa.gov.lv).
49 Interview No. 3.
cealing violations of the procurement procedure from other bidders as well
as from the general public.50
The procurement for resources of EU funds is not separated from other
types of public procurement. The same regulation applies to all public pro-
curement. Potential problems and corruption risks are the same irrespec-
tive of the resources at the basis of the procurement. The alignment of the
procedure and the minimisation of corruption risks in the area of public
procurement in general will reduce these risks also in the expending of EU
funds.
Public procurement is not a problem characteristic only for Latvia. It has
been recognised to be a problem area in practically all member states
where EU funds are implemented. The EU has tried through regulations to
make this area more effective and transparent. Practice and statements
given during interviews show that there are problems in the legal regula-
tion as well as in its application, however, the most serious problems still
ensue from the application of regulation. Legal culture lags behind the legal
regulation. “There is a problem with public procurement all the time, and
considerable preventive work must be undertaken to achieve a good result.
Cases when the procurement has been conducted correctly are very rare.”51
Problems can be found not only in the actions of project implementers
(organisers of the procurement procedure) also in the actions of their su-
pervisors. The path of legalistic nihilism is chosen instead of introducing
the required amendments in the legal regulation. For example, “as concerns
the involvement of tutors for doctoral theses on the basis of an enterprise
agreement, the Procurement Monitoring Bureau does not say that it is not
logical to conduct such procurement but recognises that procurement con-
cerning tutors for doctoral theses must be performed separately in each
specific case, thus the procurement threshold amount is not exceeded and
the procurement procedure need not be organised.”52 Although the problem
was solved, still the way how it was done, is not acceptable.
29
50 Korupcijas novēršanas un apkarošanas birojs. Vēstule Nr. 1-04/703 Satversmes
tiesai “Par likuma “Grozījumi Publisko iepirkumu likumā” (Saeimā pieņemts
16.07.2009.) 46. un 50. pantu”, 29.10.2009. (Letter of the CPCB No. 1-04/703 of
29.10.09 to the Constitutional Court “On Articles 46 and 50 of the Law on Amend-
ments to the Public Procurement Law (adopted by the Saeima in 16.07.2009)). Not
published.
51 Interview No. 3.
52 Interview No. 6.
Such practice gives an undesirable signal about the admissibility of a for-
malistic approach to the organisation of public procurement. “Often the
procurement is organised formally only to comply with requirements of
regulatory enactments. Procurement is organised for people who are already
known.”53 Often it is related to the applicability of the formal requirements
of public procurement to the attraction of human resources.54
At present a range of violations has been detected in the organisation of
procurement. The most frequent violations are as follows:55
A. Procurement documentation prescribes requirements that restrict the
range of bidders without due justification (procurement specifications
and candidate selection regulations have not been formulated in an appro-
priate manner thus discriminating other bidders and failing to ensure
equal treatment for all bidders).
B. Bidders are rejected on the basis of criteria that are not included in the
technical specification, and a bidder is chosen who had no “advantage”
according to the technical specification for the award of the contract
(e.g., on the grounds that there has been good cooperation earlier etc.).
C. The commissioning party awards and concludes the contract with the
bidder whose offer does not comply with the technical specification.
D. Procurement is broken down into several smaller procurements to evade
the application of the procurement procedure that is applicable to the
total contract amount.
E. A specific amount is established upon the conclusion of a contract with
the bidder, however, in most cases additional contracts are concluded
for additional assignments (which, in actual fact, are not additional as-
signments and which could have been planned already at the beginning
of the procurement) to evade the procurement procedure with a higher
threshold.
F. Incomplete procurement documentation, e.g., records do not contain
complete information (e.g., there is no argumentation for the evalua-
tion of bids, the criteria followed in taking the decision) or records that
reflect the progress of the procedure are not included at all.
30
53 Interviews No. 7 and No. 8.
54 Augstskolas neizpratnē, ka vieslektori “jāiepērk” kā preces (Higher Educational
Institutions Mystified that Guest Lecturers Should be “Procured” like Goods).
Diena.lv http://tiny.cc/6sz9s Last accessed: 24.05.2010.
55 See, for example, decisions of the Procurement Monitoring Bureau No. 8-1/6613
of 18.12.09., No. 8-2/5824 of 19.10.09, No. 8-2/4622 of 11.08.09, etc.
G. Contracts with bidders are concluded for other amounts that are higher
than the amount given in the bid and in the decision of the procure-
ment commission.
H. Insufficient accessibility of information about the procurement.
At present there is only administrative control over the procurement
process. There is no real liability for violations in the organisation of pro-
curements that generates the feeling of all permissiveness and does not
restrain from the commission of violations. Although in the formal sense
there is a possibility of holding people administratively liable for viola-
tions in the area of public procurement, still due to legal problems liabil-
ity prescribed by the Latvian Code of Administrative Violations cannot be
applied. As a result not a single person has been held administratively
liable during the last six years.56
To eliminate the detected problems, it is necessary to undertake complex
measures directed towards enhancing the openness and legality of the or-
ganisation of procurement. Separate measures will not reduce the prob-
lems. Likewise the issue of liability should be considered and additional
preventive monitoring measures should be undertaken (the ex ante exami-
nation of procurement documents). Measures that reduce monitoring and
control are not permissible.57 Besides, other measures should be under-
taken to reduce formalism and the nihilistic approach to the organisation
of the procurement procedure.
In addition explanations and training should be provided on the organisa-
tion of procurement as at present the procurement documentation is not of
the required quality. A vivid example of the current practice is the demand
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tiesai “Par likuma “Grozījumi Publisko iepirkumu likumā” (Saeimā pieņemts
16.07.2009.) 46. un 50. pantu”, 29.10.2009. (Letter of the CPCB No. 1-04/703 of
29.10.09 to the Constitutional Court “On Articles 46 and 50 of the Law on Amend-
ments to the Public Procurement Law (adopted by the Saeima in 16.07.2009)). Not
published.
57 Latvijas Republikas Satversmes tiesa. Spriedums lietā Nr. 2009-77-01 “Par Pub-
lisko iepirkumu likuma 83.2 panta un pārejas noteikumu 12. punkta atbilstību
Latvijas Republikas Satversmes 1. un 92. pantam”. 19.04.2010. (Judgment of the
Constitutional Court of 19.04.10. in case No. 2009-77-01 “On Compliance of Arti-
cle 83.2 of the Law on Public Procurement and Clause 12 of Interim Provisions to
Articles 1 and 92 of the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia). Available:
http://tiny.cc/x70q6 Last accesssed: 29.05.2010.
of the SEDA that 17 local governments repay the money of the ESF as it has
been paid to teachers without due justification.58
3.9. Ineffectiveness of control in project implementation
The economically difficult situation has affected the capacity of project
implementers as well. In the interviews respondents indicate the restricted
resources of project implementers to effectively administer projects of EU
funds. Resources are insufficient to achieve a maximum positive outcome.
For example, a project implementer indicates that “upon the organisation
of a procurement procedure for public works the procurement commission
cannot afford inviting a qualified construction specialist.”59
If inconsistencies are detected in project implementation in due time, it is
possible to prevent the appearance of losses. In one of the interviews the
respondent expressed the view that at present several unacceptable trends
could be observed. “Some ministries perceive the large number of detected
inconsistencies as a negative assessment of their work. There is also evidence
of particular loyalty to the national budget. Control services fail to report
inapplicable costs, as they should be reimbursed from the national budget
and the possibility that control will be exercised by EU institutions is com-
paratively small.”60 Thus additional attention should be paid to the effi-
ciency of these controls, preventing violations or reversing the opinion
expressed by the said respondent. Lack of trust destroys the effectiveness
of control in general.
4. General conclusions
The management system of EU funds must be rational – it must prevent
abuse, without obstructing the effective implementation of resources. Only
by reducing failings and corruption risks it is possible to ensure an effec-
tive, fair and legal expending of resources of EU funds.
The greatest corruption risks are possible at the project application evalua-
tion stage and the area of public procurement. Member states as well as the
EU must take measures to promote the growth of openness and legality.
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Local Governments). Latvijas Avīze, 12.03.2010.
59 Interview No. 6.
60 Interview No. 9.
In the area of public procurement corruption risks do not exceed those
risks that exist in general in the expending of public funding. Improve-
ments in this area must be comprehensive and on-going constituting a
guarantee for the minimisation of risks.
Potential corruption risks are also generated by the economic crisis and
the current reforms in the system of education.61 Likewise the low rate of
the acquisition of EU funds may increase corruption risks. A set of hasty
and ill-considered decisions may be taken upon the approach of the dead-
line for the acquisition of EU funds.
EU funds have become the basic funding for sectors of education and science
although in essence it should be additional funding for the development of
specific sectors only. For example, “instead of investing resources of EU
funds in the improvement and strengthening of the basic system (the
completion of the implementation of the Bologna system), resources are
channelled into other areas. The payment of scholarships to students of
master’s studies and doctoral studies can be supported, however, only if
the basic system has been put in order.”62 Moreover, in the event of Latvia
ceasing to receive funding from EU funds sectors of education and science
may face a crisis.
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61 During the reform process the description of the management and control sys-
tem did not or does not always correspond to reality as institutional and func-
tional changes are or were under way in several institutions. For some time
institutional bylaws were not updated or have not been updated in line with the
situation that had developed.
62 Interview No. 10.
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